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Drawing on real-time video, an audio journal, interviews and field notes from the first-ever attempt 
to scull the navigable Amazon, we explore the promise of carnal sociology to enrich our 
understanding of embodied organizational sensemaking. We investigate the body’s role in 
sensemaking from two vantage points: “of the body” and “from the body”. Using methodological 
and conceptual anchors provided in Wacquant’s carnal sociology, we contrast what each approach 
tells us about the nature and process of sensemaking. Doing so helps us outline a complementary 
approach to embodied sensemaking that attends to (1) how a “new way of seeing” the body as 
sentient, sedimented, situated, and capable of suffering enables a more holistic understanding of 
the role of embodiment in sensemaking; (2) the importance this then places on the “who” of 
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SENSEMAKING FROM THE BODY: AN ENACTIVE ETHNOGRAPHY OF ROWING 
THE AMAZON 
 
“Once we acknowledge that cognition is a situated activity growing out of a tangled dance of body, 
mind, activity, and world … you have the building blocks for a flesh-and-blood sociology, capable 
of producing multidimensional, polychrome accounts of social life that seize life as it actually 
unfolds, instead of the torpid reports in black and white that we now read in academic journals.” 
(Wacquant, 2015: 4) 
 
Organizational phenomena occasionally show up in surprising ways. Such has been the case 
with sensemaking for example, where classic discoveries were generated from studies of extreme 
contexts (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Weick, 2010) and of temporary or minimal organizations 
(Weick, 1993; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). It is here after all that the relationships between making 
sense and enacting social structures are often most apparent and consequential (Bechky, 2006; 
Bigley & Roberts, 2001). Indeed, as Weick’s (1993) account of the simultaneous disintegration of 
sensemaking and structure in Mann Gulch demonstrates, a breakdown in meaning and its 
amplification across a small “outfit of men” can yield important insights into group dynamics, 
leadership and resilience in more conventional organizations.  
Our paper follows in this tradition by leveraging extensive video footage and the embodied 
experience of one author in an usual context: an endeavor to scull1 the approximately 2,100 miles 
of the navigable Amazon unsupported.2 What began as idle talk turned serious such that late in the 
Peruvian winter of 2013, three men took to the water. Two of them did not speak either of the 
useful languages (Spanish and Portuguese) and neither knew much about a third companion who 
                                               
1 Sculling is a form a rowing where one has one oar in each hand, in contrast with “sweep rowing” where rowers 
each use one (larger) oar held with both hands. 
2 While this feat was recognized as a world-first, it is important to place it into perspective: given that the river is the 
only thoroughfare into the Amazon region, it is inconceivable that people haven’t clocked up more impressive 
accounts in the past (even if not in a double scull). Moreover, the full (rather than “navigable”) length of the river 
had already been kayaked, swum and walked, prior to our attempt.  
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entered the fray at the final hour to keep them safe. Their boat had been badly damaged in transit 
and needed bailing out constantly on a river notorious for piracy and the traffic in narcotics. 
Pushing off from an embankment in Nauta (Peru), it quickly became clear that safety and 
efficiency would have to be worked out on an ongoing basis over 31 days and nights of more or 
less continuous rowing.  
With its emphasis on how “people work to understand issues or events that are novel, 
ambiguous [or] confusing” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014: 57), one might reasonably expect the 
literature on sensemaking to have something to say about how the voyage unfolded. Equally, one 
might expect real-time data from this voyage to help advance our understanding of the body’s role 
in sensemaking. In his original formulation Weick already recognized the role of embodied 
capacities, limitations, and personal histories in sensemaking; recall, for example, how Dodge, an 
“experienced woodsman,” tried to lead his less experienced crew out of danger by lighting an 
escape fire in Mann Gulch. Yet reviews of the literature suggest that a long tradition of subsequent 
empirical studies have treated sensemaking principally as a cognitive and discursive process 
(Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 17). In response, recent work has begun 
to explore how specific aspects of being embodied shape sensemaking (Cornelissen, Mantere & 
Vaara, 2014; Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Heaphy, 2017). Successful attempts at locating the 
impact of visceral and emotional reactions, in turn, generated calls for greater attention to the 
“lived experience” of embodiment, to “bodily sensations, felt experiences, emotions and sensory 
knowing” (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012: 64), or to our perceptual experience and mode of presence 
and engagement in the world (Csordas, 1994: 12). Without such attention to the lived experience 
of sensemaking, we risk prioritizing outcome (sense made) over process (sensemaking) and 
favoring—because they are more easily available—traces of sensemaking that can be captured in 
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spoken word or text. To focus only on the cognitive and discursive aspects of sensemaking then is 
to miss how sensemaking unfolds in action, perhaps fleetingly, through immediate and embodied 
“absorbed coping” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 17). 
In this paper we respond to calls for novel empirical research into embodied sensemaking 
(Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Gartner, 2013; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015), and contribute to the broader conversation on organizational sensemaking that, by any 
account, has become a critically important topic in organization studies (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015) that is central to decision-making (e.g. Cornelissen, Mantere & 
Vaara, 2014), strategic change (e.g. Gioia & Thomas, 1996), organizational learning (e.g. 
Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009), and innovation (e.g. Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 
1999). Over a hundred hours of video footage of the Amazon voyage, an audio journal, fieldnotes, 
interviews, and one of the authors having “perform[ed] the phenomenon” under study (Wacquant, 
2015: 1), afford us a unique opportunity to explore how the body is complicit in sensemaking. For 
example, by exploring the video and interview data, using conventional coding techniques, we saw 
how the rowers probed their changing environment, took action within it, and communicated 
among themselves using their bodies. Yet, despite months of analytic work, the video footage left 
much of embodiment unaccounted for, including the role of physical transformation, intimacy, 
fear and anxiety in the embodied experience of sensemaking. This realization afforded us an 
opportunity: what if we were to generate two complementary, yet different, analytical accounts of 
the role of the body in sensemaking by leveraging all available data? The first of these, consistent 
with recent scholarship on embodied sensemaking (e.g. Cunliffe & Coupland; 2012; Cornelissen, 
Mantere & Vaara, 2014; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010), would draw primarily on the video data to 
generate an account of the body. The second account would emerge from the body and be relayed 
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in the first person. In addition to video data, it would also rely on a real-time audio journal, 
fieldnotes, and recollections of what it actually “felt like” for the fieldworker who performed the 
phenomenon under study. This latter account would leverage an ontology, epistemology and 
methodology advocated by the sociologist Loïc Wacquant, and referred to as “carnal sociology”.  
This paper is structured to reflect our use of these two distinct forms of analysis and the 
theoretical insights they afford into the role of the body in sensemaking. Each of two findings 
sections is preceded by a discussion of the distinct methodology used to generate and analyze the 
data. By drawing out contrasts between these two accounts, we develop specific insights into 
organizational sensemaking that are afforded by carnal sociology as a new way of seeing. These 
include: (1) how regarding the body as sentient, sedimented, situated, and capable of suffering 
(Wacquant, 2015) enables a more holistic understanding of the mindful body and embodied mind 
in sensemaking; (2) the importance this then places on the “who” of sensemaking; and (3) the 
broader methodological implications of carnal sociology for sensemaking. Our findings show how 
sensemaking is forged from, and into, corporeal experience, allowing us to transcend the truism 
that sensemaking takes sensory input into account and advance the more interesting claim that 
sensemaking relies on the details of our corporeal experience. We develop implications of these 
insights for more conventional organizational settings and suggest that a carnal sociology approach 
can enrich our understanding of sensemaking as it unfolds in processes like socialization, identity 
and change, and through everyday interactions around coordination or routines.  
ORGANIZATIONAL SENSEMAKING 
In their extensive review of the literature, Maitlis and Christianson (2014) highlight four 
features of sensemaking: (i) it is a process that unfolds over time; (ii) cues play a central role in 
triggering and shaping sensemaking; (iii) it is social; and (iv) it concerns action insofar as a sense 
  6 
of the situation enables people to act. Maitlis and Christianson offer a definition that includes these 
features in asserting that sensemaking is “a process, prompted by violated expectations, that 
involves attending to and bracketing cues in the environment, creating intersubjective meaning 
through cycles of interpretation and action, and thereby enacting a more ordered environment from 
which further cues can be drawn” (2014: 67). This definition also reaffirms three moves long 
considered central to sensemaking: noticing or bracketing cues, interpreting them, and taking 
action (Daft & Weick 1984; Thomas et al. 1993).  
To date, however, sensemaking scholars have paid far more attention to the interpretation of 
cues than to the other two moves: how cues are noticed and how they entangle with action. 
Sandberg and Tsoukas note that 84 percent of the studies they reviewed “do not seem to make a 
distinction between the “creation” and the “interpretation” process but treat them instead as one 
and the same. Thus, in contrast with Weick’s early work, they argue that processes of sensemaking, 
as portrayed in the contemporary literature, have become “synonymous with processes of 
interpretation” (2015: 14).  
This focus on interpretation gives the sensemaking literature its distinctly cognitive character, 
with several studies focused explicitly on how sensemaking updates or challenges cognitive 
schemata (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Elsbach, Barr & Hargadon, 2005; Luscher & Lewis, 2008; 
Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). Other works adopt a constructionist perspective, asserting that 
sensemaking unfolds “in the discourses of social members—the intersubjective social world—
rather than simply occurring in their minds” (Gephart, 1993: 1470; quoted in Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014: 95). Here, the emphasis is on how discourse and interaction guide 
sensemaking as it emerges between leaders and organizational members (Corley & Gioia, 2004; 
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Pratt, 2000; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Sonenshein, 2010). Still, “sense made” in 
these studies is discussed in terms that foreground cognition.  
This predominance of attending to interpretation and foregrounding cognition stems from at 
least two sources. First, methodologically it is conceivably easier to study interpretation and the 
construction of meaning through narrative and discursive traces. Noticing and acting, on the other 
hand, are situated and fleeting, and less amenable to accurate post-hoc data collection. Second, 
interpretation fits readily with other intersubjective meaning-making processes that organizational 
theorists connect with sensemaking, including individual and collective identity (Corley & Gioia 
2004; Maitlis 2009; Pratt, Rockmann & Kaufmann, 2006), organizational change, leadership, 
negotiation and power, and framing (Abolafia, 2010; Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Sonenshein 2010; 
Rouleau & Balogun, 2011).  
Recent work calls for different perspectives, however. Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015: 17) argue 
for attention to a more immediate, embodied “absorbed coping” as sensemaking, which would 
address Weick’s (2009: 130) original question of how people “[act] their way into sense.” Others 
have begun to probe how sensemaking unfolds when the material world is present and 
consequential (Whiteman & Cooper, 2011; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012), and people’s bodies and 
emotions are implicated in how they act (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). 
However, their data typically afford limited insight into the lived embodied experience of 
sensemaking 3 , and hence the interpenetration of action with interpretation or meaning. To 
overcome these challenges requires “adopting a more complex ontology than the one that 
                                               
3 An exception is Whiteman & Cooper’s (2011) paper which foregrounds the first author’s role in performing the 
phenomenon to develop an account of “ecological sensemaking.” Whiteman’s lack of embeddedness in the harsh 
Canadian subarctic environment led to her slipping and falling into a river, risking drowning. However, despite the 
obvious implicit role of bodies in their account, Whiteman and Cooper do not theorize the role of bodies and bodily 
capacities in relation to sensemaking. 
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conceives of the world as a collection of objects with specific properties” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2015: 14).  
One such ontology may be found in Wacquant’s carnal sociology, situated theoretically at the 
meeting point of Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) phenomenology, Bourdieu’s theory of habitus 
(1990, 2000), and the broad movement characterized as the “embodied turn” in cognitive science 
(cf. Clark, 1998; Damasio, 1999; Gärtner, 2013; Shapiro, 2010). Carnal sociology’s ontological 
claim is intuitively straightforward: the social agent is a suffering being of flesh and blood who 
relates to the world, acts in the world, and reflects upon the world using all available senses in 
processes shaped by a particular social biography and social position, and by social conditions and 
conditionings. As Wacquant (2018) explains, this ontology is an alternative to two prevailing 
views of agency in the social sciences today: that of homo economicus on the one hand, and homo 
culturalis on the other. The first presents itself as universalist, moved by the maximization of self-
interest; the second as historically specific, moved instead by culture and its variants (institutions, 
identity, symbols, language, etc.). Each of these is based on a Cartesian dualistic ontology that 
conceives of agency as an intelligent mind mounted on a what is effectively a dumb organism.  
Carnal sociology views the body and mind instead as a single entity, such that the mind is 
embodied and the body mindful (Clark, 2016; Damasio, 1999; Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987; 
Shapiro, 2010). For Wacquant, social agents are forever located in physical and social space, 
endowed with resources, and equipped with categories, skills and desires (the three aspects of 
Bourdieu’s theory of habitus). But while a carnal sociology negates neither the neo-utilitarian nor 
neo-symbolist treatments of agency (in a real sense, it subsumes them), these properties alone do 
not make for an embodied social theory, let alone a sensemaking that allows for “corporeal 
knowhow”. Wacquant’s (2018) call for a sociology of flesh and blood expressly recognizes that 
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beyond thinking wielders of symbols, human beings are sentient, suffering, skilled, sedimented, 
and situated. They are sentient insofar as they are endowed with senses, able to feel and see and 
perceive and smell, to be conscious of doing so, and able to understand what it is their senses 
subjectively capture. As Damasio (2000) shows, the role of the body is critical in acting as the 
synthesizing medium of all this sensory awareness. But human agents also suffer in that they are 
“exposed to the threats and blows of the natural and social world; [have] needs, yearnings, and 
desires that do not get fulfilled; [… and they are] constantly subjected to the judgment of others 
while [facing] the inescapable coming of death. As such, [they live] in anguish, distress and pain, 
and yet they endure” (Wacquant, 2015: 3; cf. Becker, 1973).  
Human agents are skilled, having learned how to do certain things competently. These skills 
are “implanted, cultivated and deployed over time through our engagement in the world, and are 
gradually deposited in our body as the layered product of our varied individual and collective 
histories” (Wacquant, 2015: 4; cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). That is to say, skills are 
sedimented. This sedimentation, in turn, “is shaped by our unique location and peregrinations in 
physical and social space, precisely because we are protected by, and locked in, the fragile physical 
envelope of our mortal organism, which cannot be at two places at a given time [yet] integrates 
the traces of the many places we have occupied over time” (Wacquant, 2015: 4). In other words, 
agency is situated. These properties—symbol-wielding, sentient, suffering, skilled, sedimented, 
and situated—flow and evolve with time and are the building blocks for a flesh and blood 
sociology (Wacquant, 2015: 4).  
Carnal sociology and its methodological program of “enactive ethnography” is perhaps most 
easily understood by contrasting inquiry that proceeds from the body, with more conventional 
studies of the body (Wacquant, 2018). Thus, and consistent with Wacquant (2004, 2005), our paper 
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is structured along two distinct empirical analyses: of the body and from the body. Before 
elaborating on carnal (from the body) sociology, we describe our use of more conventional 
methods to study the role of the body in sensemaking on the Amazon.  
RESEARCH SETTING 
On 13th September 2013, and after eight months of preparation, Anton, Mark and Miguel4 
boarded a bright yellow ocean rowing boat in Nauta (Peru). Their aim was to reach Macapá 
(Brazil) within thirty-one days. At over 2,000 miles in length, bendy, and varying in width 
(depending on rainfall) from 200 feet to 120 miles wide, the Amazon is widely considered the 
world’s most dangerous and most voluminous river.  
So as to mitigate the risk of piracy, Anton and Mark decided at the last minute, at the strong 
recommendation of locals, to take someone else along. Miguel was afraid of no one, but nor did 
he trust anyone. A novice when it came to rowing, he had grown up in the jungle and had relied 
on the river for transport and sustenance (see Photo 1). While Anton and Mark had never rowed 
the Amazon, they were experienced oarsmen. Their intentions were multiple and only ever vaguely 
defined as an escape from the mess they’d been responsible for creating midlife. The idea had 
originally been Anton’s. Mark figured that the journey might make for interesting research and 
was careful to chronicle everyday life on board, using an audio journal, fieldnotes, and video. 
Anton’s eagerness to document the trip so as to try and commercialize the footage, is one of the 
reasons we have so much of it on film. To leverage the material for an exploration of embodied 
sensemaking was very much an afterthought. Indeed, we consider the absence of a research 
question prior to the actual journey one of the strengths of this paper, in that it greatly reduced the 
risk of anyone “playing to the camera” or “spinning a narrative” to suit a specific research interest.  
                                               
4 Pseudonym 
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--- Insert Photo 1 here --- 
The oarsmen were required to check in with the Brazilian Navy at major cities along the route. 
During one of these obligatory stops in Manaus, Miguel decided he’d had enough and left Anton 
and Mark to continue the journey without him. What had originally been intended as an adventure 
for two ended just so, with two gaunt and sunburned oarsmen dragging a battered boat into a 
grubby Macapá marina. By that time, they had virtually depleted their supply of fresh drinking 
water, damaged the rudder, and lost two feet of keel and a considerable amount of bodyweight. 
Their satellite phone had run out of units and stopped working. As Mark recorded in his fieldnotes:  
… and there really is very little else to say. We made our flight to Belem and onto Brasilia 
and Sao Paulo. Neither of us had time for a shower and so we sat out the various plane 
rides in whatever piece of clothing seemed least offensive. I flew to Sao Paulo bare-
chested, having not one clean shirt to my name. We were hungry and thirsty for beer or 
Coke but anything cold would have done the trick. We were finally on our way home. 
We had lost thirty kilograms between us in body weight and were exhausted for rarely 
having slept more than three hours at a time for a month. Our egos were bruised, as were 
our bodies, and the minds that should have been quieted over the long row were noisier 
now than before we began. Our souls never did get mended and so fuck the purging. 
Before we got depressed, we were happy. 
METHODOLOGY I: A VIDEO-BASED ANALYSIS 
Data Sources. Our analyses rely on 755 video segments (ranging from under a minute to over 
an hour in duration), supplemented by recorded and transcribed post-journey interviews with two 
of the rowers. A substantial amount of the video data capture real time activity, as the camera, 
mounted on top of the boats’ cabin and oriented towards the rowers was often left to run for long 
periods at random intervals (see Photo 2). We relied primarily on these videos in our initial analysis 
because they best capture (absent the tools of carnal sociology) the engagement of the body in 
sensemaking. Of our 755 video files, 602 (80%) feature the rowers at work (with the camera 
mounted to the boat) or undertaking other activities on the boat or in towns along the way, and 153 
(20%) show one or more of them talking directly into the camera. In these latter “talking heads” 
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video segments, one rower holds the camera in a “selfie” position and records reflections, while in 
the background others talk or work in a way that is manifestly inattentive to the camera—the 
mundane background work often proving more relevant to our analysis. Both types of footage 
were “real-time” in that they were recorded as events were still unfolding, the principal difference 
between these two types of footage being the speaker’s reflective awareness of the camera. These 
talking heads videos are thus less analogous to post-hoc interview data than they are to the real-
time informal interviewing that an ethnographer might intersperse with observations in the course 
of her fieldwork.  
--- Insert Photo 2 here --- 
A long tradition of the use of video data demonstrates their utility for the study of work, 
coordination and sensemaking (e.g., Christianson, 2017; LeBaron & Jones, 2002; Liu & Maitlis, 
2014; Hindmarsh & Pilnick, 2007; Harrison & Rouse, 2014). Video has specific affordances, 
amongst which are a permanent and detailed record of “what happened”, the ability to be viewed 
by many people and re-viewed many times, and audible and visual information that conveys 
nonverbal communication, sociomaterial interactions, and spatial configurations (Christianson, 
2018). Video data are particularly useful for studying the fine-grained detail of socially and 
materially situated interactions (Hindmarsh & Llewellyn, 2018). Each of these affordances proved 
important to our analysis. Our process, described in greater detail below, involved us attending to 
sensemaking opportunities and incidents as they arose (Heath, Hindmarsh, & Luff, 2010) through 
the more (or less) mundane everyday action of rowing. We attended to incidents in the video that 
presented clues as to what the participants were engaged in; as Hindmarsh and Llewellyn (2018: 
416) write: “Not all matter will matter for any one organizational moment. Rather, there is a prima 
facie case for privileging only those features that organizational members utilize, invoke or index 
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in producing and coordinating action.” Next, we detail how we oriented to these incidents in our 
data and analyzed them through iterative coding.  
Data Analysis. The two authors not involved in the Amazon row led the analysis of the video 
data, supplemented by an analysis of interview transcripts. First, one author carefully watched all 
of the video data, and, consulting closely with the other author on what he was finding, summarized 
its content using a spreadsheet to capture which video segments would be subject to closer analysis 
due to their having captured episodes of sensemaking (Heath, et al., 2010). Of the 755 videos, 54 
were found to be particularly illustrative of sensemaking. These captured instances of the oarsmen: 
i) negotiating daily ambiguities like navigating (37 videos); ii) working through more abrupt 
disruptive events like keel damage from running aground (14 videos), or iii) what Weick labels 
“cosmology episodes,” or moments “when people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no 
longer a rational, orderly system” (1993: 633). The latter appeared in only three videos that capture 
the rowers’ sense of unease as they were rowing in a tidal zone. 
We re-watched and coded the subset of 54 videos, using a version (v7) of Atlas.ti able to 
handle video files. The two authors involved in the video analysis developed an emergent coding 
scheme. We paid attention in our coding to sources of surprise or ambiguity, and how the rowers 
responded to these. To refine the coding, these authors watched multiple video segments together 
and discussed the codes and their application. Mark was not involved in this coding work, although 
we periodically discussed our analysis together and he was able to elaborate on what was seen in 
the video. We applied codes to capture sources of daily ambiguities, using terms like “current,” 
“wind,” “bodily discomfort,” and sources of disruptive events, using terms like “hitting [sand] 
banks and [river] bottom.” We also applied codes to capture what appeared to be responses to 
these, including “dousing and drying their bodies” (to relieve the discomfort apparently due to 
  14 
intense heat), or “chasing currents” (to orient the boat toward an apparently more favorable 
current). Not surprisingly, the most frequently used codes were those relating to daily ambiguities 
and the need to maintain a schedule in the face of these.  
Our analysis was enhanced by watching the videos in chronological order; through this, we 
were able to detect cumulative changes that were relevant to embodied sensemaking, but which 
might not have been picked up by looking at isolated incidents. For example, videos at a Karaoke 
bar days before beginning the voyage show a buoyant and seemingly well-fed team, a stark contrast 
with the gaunt, anxious, and emotionally frail men we see in the journey’s later videos. We relied 
on the interviews with the two rowers, conducted separately and a few months following the row 
but prior to the video coding, to supplement our analysis. The interviews helped us understand the 
chronology and key events in the journey and by revisiting them we could fill in detail on how 
things observed in the video (e.g., the rowers paying attention to GPS readings) were being used 
to assess and respond to the unfolding situation (e.g., the speed of the boat held signals about the 
state of the current). 
Several things became clear through our video coding and analysis. First, we could not rely 
on talk as a primary means of capturing unfolding sense in that rowing rhythm relies on felt 
experience.5 Similarly, rowers feel the water and get a sense of its movement from the way their 
boat is directed and the purchase they experience when their oars connect with it. Hence, the rowers 
typically said relatively little, communicating instead through gestures, expressions or movements 
of their bodies. Second, the body’s physical and emotional states were implicated in sensemaking 
                                               
5Anton interrupted an interview in a boathouse to hook two Concept II rowing machines to each other using sliders so the two 
authors conducting the video analysis could row, one behind the other, to feel how movements were transmitted between us. We 
were also able to get some sense of this from an exploratory double sculling outing on the River Cam. Our efforts to gain an 
embodied sense of the physical act of rowing helped us understand the video data by demonstrating how cues about water 
conditions, or other rowers’ movements, could be revealed without words or explicitly communicative gestures. 
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and these seemed to change over time. Moods and the tone of interpersonal interactions varied 
greatly, and while reasons for this—a tough stretch of wind, or someone having to disrupt another’s 
sleep for assistance—were sometimes evident, they were not always clear to us. As Anton explains 
in one video segment: “You’d be impressed if we could record how much we’re fighting. … [but] 
you don’t get to film these things. When things go wrong, you’re too busy getting stressed and 
getting upset about it.” Accordingly, we knew our video analysis would miss some aspects of the 
lived experience of sensemaking and how it unfolded. 
To convey the results of our analysis, we focus on four instances of sensemaking. Three of 
these are illustrative of either instances of daily ambiguity (namely, a preoccupation with boat 
speed), or disruptive events (struggling with a whirlpool, and coping with physical injury, the latter 
of which also illustrates the cumulative disruptive effect of what began as a daily ambiguity of 
bodily discomfort). As is frequently the case with inductive qualitative analysis, we selected these 
examples because they are of analytical importance to understanding embodied sensemaking under 
different circumstances. Finally, our fourth instance is rowing in the tidal zone, which, as our 
dataset’s sole example of a highly disorienting cosmology event, further enables us to explore the 
role of the body in diverse circumstances that demand sensemaking.  
 We make our video data accessible using QR codes (the default camera apps in most 
smartphones can read QR codes; free QR code reading apps are also available for download). 
Scanning a QR code will take the reader to a corresponding YouTube video. For convenience, 
each video comes with a “how to watch this video” caption, which the viewer optionally can use 
to scroll through and quickly see the most critical moments of each video. Photos are included 
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purely for illustrative purposes. These visual aids are designed to bring the reader as close as 
possible to “the action”.6  
FINDINGS I: SENSEMAKING “OF THE BODY” 
Preoccupation with boat speed. While much work on sensemaking foregrounds the bracketing 
and interpretation of experience that triggers (cognitive) sense being made, our analysis reveals 
that sensemaking also relies on cues provided first and foremost by the sensate body. For example, 
much of the rowers’ attention was consumed by navigating the daily ambiguities of where the 
fastest water flowed and how they might maneuver into it. Yet, this proceeded as much from the 
body’s senses as from mental attention. For instance, one of our cameras caught Anton and Miguel 
in action five days into the journey. Music plays in the background and, rather than interact with 
the camera, they row with few words spoken between them. The ergonomic orientation of sculling 
is such that rowers propel the boat in the direction to which their backs are turned, which means 
that they must look over their shoulders in order to see where they are going. About one minute 
into the video, Anton glances over his shoulder and asks toward the bow of the boat, “you trying 
to head out into it?” Miguel replies: “Yeah, just [inaudible over music, glances over shoulder and 
gestures to the direction they are rowing]. Let’s check it out.” The two continue rowing for 70 
seconds, during which time Anton makes a few comments about dolphins and Miguel remains 
silent but glances at the deck-mounted GPS six times. On the seventh occasion Miguel’s gaze fixes 
on the GPS for nine seconds and then he glances over his shoulder to Anton, who sits behind him, 
and says, “Look how fast it picked up.” As he says the words “picked up,” Miguel gestures with 
                                               
6 For those keen to see more video segments of the journey, we have made a bigger sample available here: 
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his head back to the GPS. Miguel then begins bobbing his head to the rock music just beginning 
to play from the onboard stereo. Seven seconds later he shouts to no one in particular, “WE’RE 
BACK IN BUSINESS”. Six seconds later he stops rowing and turns around to offer Anton a high-
five. Grinning widely (a rare occurrence for the typically stern Miguel), he gestures with his hands 
to the GPS in a self-congratulatory manner as can be seen in this video segment:  
 
 
It is evident that the rowers’ efforts were significantly experienced and communicated through 
feel, by their hands, legs, and backs noticing the movement of the boat and transmitting information 
about the boat’s direction and the other rower’s intentions through the boat and oars. Suspecting 
that they could be moving faster, and without talking, Miguel began to turn the boat perpendicular 
to their downstream course. Only after feeling Miguel beginning to turn the boat does Anton speak, 
asking, “you trying to head out into it?” Miguel literally acts his way in to sense, initiating his 
movement of the boat on a hunch—to “check it out”—and only knowing a stronger current has 
been found when he and Anton confirm the boat’s quickening through GPS readings. This example 
captures the real-time engagement of the body as a sensory organ in working through the ongoing 
ambiguities surrounding the voyage. In a video diary filmed from inside the boat’s cabin after this 
and similar episodes, Mark reflects on their emerging understanding of how to row the Amazon:  
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We were just so exhausted, we didn’t get very much sleep. So what we’ve done instead 
is just to accept that you don’t really row the Amazon … You don’t attack the Amazon; 
it’s too powerful. So what you do is ride it, and let it take you where you want to go. So 
the emphasis now is not on rowing as hard as we can. The emphasis is really on finding 
the fastest current and chasing it ... It makes the rowing lighter, it allows us to get a bit 
more sleep and makes the experience a little bit more pleasant than the misery it is if you 
don’t get enough sleep. 
 
 
It is clear from these and many other video segments, and from our interviews with Mark and 
Anton, that “chasing currents” had become a major preoccupation on board. The Amazon is 
enormous and ever-changing, as tributaries come and go, and weather and water depth change 
frequently. As a result, it was often unclear where the river water was quickest, and a great deal of 
embodied activity such as that documented above was performed to seek river and rowing 
conditions that might get the oarsmen to their destination safely and quickly. Following a tough 
and demoralizing first night on the river, the rowers worked out over the next several days that 
average speeds of 6 miles per hour (MPH) by day and 4 MPH by night were feasible, and that a 
24-hour rowing schedule based on these speeds would see them to their destination on time. This 
provisional understanding was made possible, in part, by a GPS device that logged current boat 
speed down to a tenth of a mile an hour. Its readings soon became integral to the everyday work 
and talk on the boat, helping the rowers to take stock of the situation, e.g. “how’s it going? Not 
bad, we’re doing sevens” [meaning 7 MPH]. These anchors were at times used as aspirations for 
performance, e.g. “right, let’s go spank out some sixes!” (meaning let’s go row at 6+ MPH), and 
occasionally enabled lively speed competitions among the rowers. As heuristics for attainable and 
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desirable speeds, one could regard them as evidence that sense had been made of how the rowers 
could cope with the unfolding contingencies of rowing day and night in all weathers, by “hitting 
the numbers.”  
Miguel was proficient at reading currents and taught the others to look for moving debris and 
pay attention to the potential for faster flowing waters near river banks. But, as the above example 
illustrates, even he still had to “hunt” for them. Hunting for currents did become a standard bodily 
practice as well as topic of daily talk, and the heuristics for what constituted a “good” boat speed 
were taken only as guides for action. For example, even quite late in the voyage, Anton was 
captured on video saying: 
It’s a guessing game for us, because we’re not from here. The locals know where the 
stream [current] is. Miguel knew where the stream was in Peru, although on the bigger 
river he struggled as well.  
Struggling with a whirlpool. The unending ambiguity of navigating the river in a way that 
preserved both boat speed and the rowers’ capacities to produce it was occasionally punctuated by 
discrete episodes that demanded collective reflection. One such moment was caught 
unintentionally on camera, confirming the methodological utility of real time video. The camera 
had been running continuously inside the cabin for 52 minutes when Mark, who was rowing alone, 
called from outside the cabin: “Does it matter which side I’m on Miguel, or not?” After repeating 
his question, the reply from Miguel came: “Yeah, look for the one has the stronger current.” Mark 
replies: “Okay, that’s fine. That’s what I’m trying to do but it gets, I get pulled in this direction,” 
and gets cut off by Anton announcing he will have a shower. Five minutes later, Anton asks 
“Where you trying to go?”, to which Mark replies: “I’m trying to go back, but whatever … I can’t 
row when I’m pulled to the side. The rudder is always pulling ... it’s almost like a whirlpool but I 
can’t see one.” As is evident in the following video, Mark continues to struggle with maneuvering 
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the boat in the water, takes guidance from Anton on using the rudder, but expresses frustration 
about his inability to move out of a “sideways pull” in the water that only he can directly feel. 
Miguel eventually surfaces from the cabin, surveys the water, and directs Mark to “avoid a bay” 
to one side of the boat, leading Anton and Mark to surmise there is a shallow area where water is 
not flowing as expected. Despite making sense of the unexpected situation—here through the 
familiar mechanisms of talk and interaction—and a course of action through which to escape the 
whirlpool, the feel of this ambiguity rests with Mark, as does the feel of his inability to escape it. 
This is evident in the following video segment: 
 
 
Rowing in tidal waters. The bodily sensing of ambiguity arises again in a more profoundly 
disorienting episode much later in the voyage. Here, the experience seems more reminiscent of 
what Weick calls cosmology episodes, or moments “when people suddenly and deeply feel that 
the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system” (1993: 633). Less than a week before the end 
of their journey, Anton reflected on camera: “We are getting heavily crucified by the wind today 
… we can’t control the boat.” He added that sustaining a respectable boat speed, and chasing 
currents to attain it, seemed no longer possible, saying “We might only be ticking over at 3 1/2 or 
4 km per hour, but … we’re still moving forward. We’re not so much rowing with the stream 
[current] as just sat on it, trying to keep the boat pointing in the right direction.” 
Rough conditions and slow progress pervaded subsequent days and the rowers adjusted by 
shifting their rowing schedule to prioritize rowing together rather than in turns and, prior to that, 
in 30-minute shifts to preserve their backs. Four days before the end of the journey, Mark described 
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the situation as “very, very tough, morally … and also physically, Anton and I are very, very tired.” 
Just over twenty-four hours before the end of their journey, they pass through a series of islands 
on very swift current only to hit an invisible wall. They were making so little progress (1.5 to 2 
km per hour) while rowing so hard that they began to feel as if they were rowing against the 
current. After rowing close enough to the bank to put down anchor, they turned on the camera as 
they tried to test the possibility that tides had become a factor; the idea initially seemed incredulous 
as they were still over 100 km from the ocean. They threw bits of tissue into the water to see if 
these might perhaps drift backwards. They discussed waiting for the tide to change to see if their 
boat swung around the anchor. They also used the satellite phone to ask a friend to search online 
for information about how far up-river the tidal zone extends. The answer came back while the 
camera was still rolling, and Mark reported to Anton: “She says here the tide affects much beyond 
100k in. So, I think we’ve already felt the effects, but we haven’t realized what the effects were.” 
Put simply, the week’s hard rowing had been reflective of a new set of conditions, and while they 
had revised the bodily task of propelling and maneuvering the boat as they felt the effects, their 
full sense of the situation lagged.  
Coping with physical injury. Part of the reason for their delays in making sense of the tidal 
current might have been the toll the voyage and its ambiguities had taken over time on their bodies. 
Choices made earlier manifested in unforeseen consequences. The most telling examples of these 
came from the work the rowers were doing to maintain their physical conditions—and some degree 
of comfort—that would enable them to go on. While clearly their bodies felt the oars and the water 
currents, they also felt discomfort and worked through it. For example, Miguel, new to rowing, 
quickly found his hands blistered where they connected to the oars, a common novice rower’s 
scourge. Asking Anton for advice: “what do you do about blisters?”, attracted only a brusque and 
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unsympathetic response: “man up!” Indeed, an experienced rower will have rows of calluses at the 
base of the knuckles that prevent blistering as the oars are gripped and rotated. The day after being 
told to man up, Miguel is seen sporting athletic tape in no fewer than nine places on his hands (see 
Photo 3) and wearing gloves to protect the raw patches. But the body can also transform over time 
to enable, rather than disable, its capacity to feel and perform. Over a week after the first video of 
Miguel puzzling over his blisters, another shows him casually massaging his calluses and picking 
flakes of dead skin off of his hands, which at this point are not taped and not so visibly blistered.  
--- Insert Photo 3 here --- 
Some bodily maintenance practices had more enduring effects. To cope with the heat, Miguel 
and Mark had begun to douse themselves in river water while rowing. Anton seemed aware early 
on of the potential risks of this, saying on video: “They’ve taken to sloshing themselves down with 
water during the day while they’re rowing, which is all well and good, but I have pointed out that 
…[if] they’ve got water loitering around down there at the crack of their rear, that there’s a good 
chance they’ll get a massive blister there. … But, still, that’s what we’ve got the nappy [diaper] 
cream for.” Over time Mark and Miguel did both develop painful cases of “nappy rash,” and only 
then stopped drenching themselves. In Mark’s case, a significant abscess set in on his buttock that 
made sitting (and hence rowing) increasingly painful. One video shows Mark proudly and jokingly 
displaying his newly purchased nappies, acquired at a shop in Santorem, there to cushion his 
rowing seat until the abscess had grown so large that he chose to cut a hole in his rowing seat 
instead (see Photo 4). A gripping video late in the journey shows Anton performing a small surgical 
procedure, without anesthetic, to drain the abscess because its risk of spreading infection was 
thought to be substantial.  
--- Insert Photo 4 here --- 
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In sum, our analysis using the video data as a primary means of detecting the real time 
engagement of the body in sensemaking revealed that the body’s capacity to “feel” its 
surroundings, or its sensate nature, can be critical to finding a sensible way forward. The relative 
lack of talk in many of these sensemaking episodes highlights the importance of the body not 
simply in service of the mind but also as a means of acting into sense. These findings also affirm 
a social aspect to embodied sensemaking, as the communication of one sensate body to another 
can enable joint action (as when Miguel and Anton chase currents) or the lack thereof can forestall 
it (as when Mark finds himself stuck in the whirlpool). As well, they suggest a highly individual 
aspect to embodied sensemaking, insofar as it relies on the physical state of individuals’ bodies 
that evolve (differently) over time.  
Below, we proceed to outline “a new way of seeing” the same four episodes, leveraging a 
from the body approach as outlined in Wacquant’s (2005) carnal sociology. This will show up 
some key differences in how the holistic body is fully engaged in sensemaking, in a way that 
implicates not only its physical status but also its emotional and relational state, and how these are 
situated temporally, culturally and socially. 
METHODOLOGY II: A NEW WAY OF SEEING 
Given that one of the authors “enacted” the journey, we are in a position to augment these 
findings by means of a “lived experience” ethnographic account. We wrote Findings I to illustrate 
what we were able to learn by analyzing real-time video and using interviews as supplementary 
sources. We emphasized how the body can prompt sensemaking through its “feel” for its 
surroundings, and how this enters into interaction and eventually, articulated sense. In contrast, 
Findings II renders a full-body account from the perspective of the author who performed the 
phenomenon, drawing on 62 audio journal entries, fieldnotes, and the recollections these generated 
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of “how things felt” during the row. By developing this analysis of sensemaking “from the body” 
alongside a more conventional analysis of video data, we seek to clarify how an enactive 
ethnography, as proposed by Wacquant (2005), can help advance our understanding of embodied 
sensemaking. We compare and contrast the two analyses in our Discussion.  
To structure our interpretation and give it analytical bite, we ground it in an approach to social 
analysis known as carnal sociology. This theory-method bundle was developed as a response to 
overly intellectualized treatments of social life, in which human beings are principally viewed as 
mindful, rational, speech-act performing social and political beings. This intellectualized 
perspective overlooks people’s experiences as beings of flesh and blood, “sensate, suffering, 
skilled, sedimented, and situated corporeal creatures” (Wacquant, 2015: 2), fully able to capture 
the “taste and ache of action” (Wacquant 2004a, pp. vii–xii).  
Wacquant is not the first to draw attention to the risks of a “head-locked” approach to social 
analysis. As Dall’Alba, Sandberg & Sidhu (2017: 1) write, others have attempted to capture how 
the body relates to other humans and to the world around it, including Foucault’s (1977) focus on 
the body as an instrument of power, Giddens’ (1986) elaboration of practical consciousness, 
Young’s (1990) prolegomena to bodily comportment and gendering, Grosz’s (1994) description 
of bodily inscription by discursive systems, and Sheets-Johnstone’s (1999) exploration of the 
primacy of movement. Moreover, there is a now-burgeoning field of embodied cognition based on 
the intellectual roots of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and John Dewey, and greatly 
advanced by George Lakoff and colleagues (e.g. Lakoff, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008; 
Lakoff & Núñez, 2000) and leveraged to powerful effect in, for example, treatment of trauma (e.g. 
Van de Kolk, 2013).  
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The ontological assumptions of carnal sociology (as outlined earlier) are accompanied by an 
epistemological claim, namely that the forging and workings of habitus are fully open to empirical 
investigation. Wacquant (2014a, 2014b) argues that what is true of human beings in general is also 
true of the social scientist: if people “out there” know the world through sensory engagement—
through tacit schemata acquired in and for practice—organization scholars can tap that knowledge 
by subjecting themselves to the same forces, profits and perils as the people they study. 
Wacquant’s (2018) ontological claim that human agents are sentient, gendered, sexual creatures 
who suffer and are fated to die (and aware of this) is, he argues, typically dismissed by social 
scientists or reduced to irrelevance (meaning that the brute fact is acknowledged but judged as of 
no consequence for their investigations) (cf. Bourdieu, 2000). The alternative, proposed by 
Wacquant (2018: 2), is a view of knowledge that is “procedural, concrete, embodied, and 
predicated on a bottom-up, visceral grasp of the social world (which all of us have prior to positing 
objects through language and discursive knowledge)”. The knowing body is not a “black box”, in 
that it does not stand beyond the realm of observation. On the contrary, the techniques whereby it 
is forged, the ceremonies in which it is invested, and the manners in which it is deployed are all, 
Wacquant (2018) suggests, available to investigation.  
It follows that the most effective methodological approach to this fully embodied sociology is 
likely that of close up observation through pragmatic involvement in concrete activities 
(Wacquant, 2015: 4). This opens the door for what Wacquant calls “enactive ethnography,” or the 
embedded and embodied study of a phenomenon by performing it (or parts of it). Enactive 
ethnography, while resembling autoethnography, is distinct from it. Enactive ethnography 
considers the self a means of inquiry rather than an object of study, as is more typically the case 
with autoethnography. As he explains with reference to his study of pugilism (Wacquant, 1995a; 
  26 
1995b; 2004; 2011), “enactive ethnography relies on the most intimate experience, that of the 
desiring and suffering body, to grasp in vivo the collective manufacturing of the schemata of 
pugilistic perception, appreciation, and action that are shared, to varying degrees, by all boxers, 
whatever their origins, their trajectory, and their standing in the sporting hierarchy” (Wacquant 
2011: 146). His account is not just of the body as sociocultural object, and nor is it about the 
subjective self; it is from the body and about growing up in a hard-luck South Chicago 
neighborhood.  
Similarly enactive studies of social life include Desmond’s (2007) study of wildland 
firefighters, based on his experience as a member of a fire crew in northern Arizona; Purser’s 
(2009) exploration of the life of day laborers, based on her experience as a day laborer over three 
years in Oakland and Baltimore; Pachirat’s (2011) covert study of working life inside an 
industrialized slaughterhouse; and Holmes’ (2013) analysis of Mexican migrants in the American 
food system, having crossed the Mexican-US border illegally with his informants and joined them 
in planting and harvesting corn and strawberries. Each takes full epistemic advantage of the 
visceral nature of social life, by means of (or from) the body. Yet such analyses of social life remain 
scarce in the social sciences, and rarer still in organization studies.  
The findings that follow are written in the first person. They are based on multiple reviews of 
the video footage of the episodes discussed in Findings I as well as a documentary film based on 
a compilation of the available footage put together by Anton. I replayed 62 audio diary entries 
recorded by Anton and me in the relative privacy of our small cabin, and re-read my field journal, 
excerpts of which are offered to help “authenticate” and enrich the account. The ensuing enactive 
ethnography is the result of multiple dead-ends prose-wise as I struggled to convey in words what 
it all “felt like” at the time, and how it was that our bodies sometimes “knew” what our minds did 
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not, or didn’t seem to. To force embodiment to become text is, to quote the historian Trevor-Roper 
(2014: 139), a bit like forcing “a jellyfish to grit its teeth.” That is to say, the resulting account may 
be imperfect but is my best attempt yet at capturing something of the corporeality of sensemaking. 
FINDINGS II: SENSEMAKING “FROM THE BODY” 
Findings II offers a carnal sociology interpretation of the same episodes discussed in Findings 
I. When reading the incarnate account (immediately below) across these same episodes, readers 
may be surprised to find features of sensemaking foregrounded in Findings II that are absent from 
Findings I. If certain features do not figure in Findings I, it isn’t because they aren’t there—it is 
because they did not (easily) show up in the available data. Among these are experiences of fear 
and anxiety that, while rarely explicit in the video data, were among the most visceral. There are 
few more poignant reminders of the embodied nature of emotions then feeling the adrenaline 
coursing through one’s veins after a near-collision on a deadly river, days away from any medical 
assistance. It thus seems appropriate that we begin Findings II by illustrating the extent to which 
these emotions conditioned our reactions to the changing circumstances in which we found 
ourselves. Occasionally, as is the case here, a new way of seeing calls for a new way of writing. It 
is near-impossible to do justice to the finely textured, manifold experience of embodiment in prose, 
particularly within the strict conventions of scholarly journals, and to do so requires a level of 
intimacy and imagination more easily afforded by the informal and straight-talking than by the 
formal and analytical. Thus, the ensuing first-person account is deliberately free of the latter, 
beginning as it does with disappointment.  
Our yellow vessel, when it did finally arrive four weeks late, had been clumsily dropped onto 
the rocky shores of Nauta, a small commercial settlement on the north bank of the Marañòn River. 
Eager to be on our way, we pushed the boat into the fast-flowing river only to find it taking on 
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water at alarming speed. Rarely ever was the plunge from the audacious to laughing stock more 
rapid as, tails firmly tucked between the legs, we asked for the boat to be towed into dry dock, 
where we spent 12 hours repairing the consequences of a careless drop. Seeing as Miguel had used 
up all of our spare epoxy in waterproofing our rudder, he made his way back to Iquitos on an off-
roader to source some there. Anton, meanwhile, was miserable, angry at Miguel for having wasted 
our precious material and not at all sure the leaks were fixable. By the time we finally put the boat 
to water yet again in the early evening, we were emotionally spent. I ended up rowing for most of 
the first twelve hours so as to give Anton a chance to patch up the boat from the inside while 
Miguel learned to row in spurts. The following video shows the emotional strain of four weeks of 
waiting for the voyage to begin, only to find the boat badly damaged. 
 
 
When setting off from Peru, I feared the worst of the row to be the mundane and ordinary: the 
tedium of rowing, petty irritations, exhaustion and lack of hygiene. These were what I had least 
looked forward to yet, I figured, might be valuable research-wise. Ethnography is, after all, the 
study of lived experience, and whilst a trek downriver might seem out of the ordinary, in reality it 
would likely comprise plenty of monotony. And so here I was: a subject in an experiment of my 
own making, caught out on our very first night by a violent storm, wind and waves pushing us 
dangerously close to oncoming traffic. Rowing at night was to become one of our chief sources of 
anxiety, not least as the river’s elongated and unwieldy, flat-bottomed cargo barges go merrily 
about their business with all lights turned off. This made them unusually difficult to spot but—and 
this was genuinely unnerving—easy to hear as the noise of their diesel engines easily cut through 
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the black surroundings. That first night, the rain and wind carried wasps, and the wasps stung, and 
by morning we were dog-tired and sore but strangely content. As the sun finally rose, temperature 
in tow, the skies dried out, and a heavy-eyed Anton reappeared from our small cabin, wondering 
what all the kerfuffle had been about.  
By this time, Anton and I had known Miguel for a week. We had originally intended to row 
the river by ourselves yet four weeks in the company of locals and expats had left our heads filled 
with stories of schemes gone awry and of adventurers robbed and butchered in the most brutal of 
fashions. The Amazon, after all, is notorious for piracy (Romero, 2016). It was for this reason that 
we had co-opted Miguel. Scar tissue where bullets had entered his abdomen, a laparotomy scar 
and a powerful, sinewy body meant we didn’t ask too many questions about his background. Nor 
did he volunteer much except, on one occasion, his notch count. On reflection, I doubt we would 
have gotten as far as we did without him, even if his presence on board gave us far greater cause 
for concern than did the prospect of a run-in with the thugs he was there to protect us from. 
In the end, Miguel put up sticks shortly after we had moored up to check in with the Navy in 
Manaus and left us to our own devices after having finished the necessary administration. Miguel 
told us he was flying back to Iquitos. He had been disappointed at not having been able to leverage 
the row to showcase the beautiful yet fragile jungle and wildlife of the Amazon region. Frankly, I 
suspect the madness of life on board may have done his head in. He also said he’d wanted to hunt 
down a “pirate woman” he was sure had stolen his passport on a tow into the Teffe harbor.7 Anton 
and I were upset, not least as we’d compensated him for six weeks of “lost income” and he had 
                                               
7 It is doubtful this woman was a “pirate” in the sense pirates are referred to in this paper. Pirates on the Amazon are 
typically opportunists who view tourists as easy prey. The public record holds plenty examples of piracy on the 
river. As of writing this paper, the most recent incident involved British kayaker Emma Kelty, killed in September 
2017 on a stretch of the Amazon well known for criminal activity (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-41321514). Our 
“pirate” woman had been kind enough to tow us into port and acquired the name for wearing an eye patch. Miguel’s 
passport was subsequently found at the bottom of Anton’s backpack. 
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only been with us for four. Given a spat about expenses the previous night, it was unlikely he 
would reimburse us, and neither Anton nor I were keen to try our luck. It wasn’t our first, nor last, 
quarrel and quarrels happened far more often when moored up than when rowing on the water.  
Yet Miguel’s departure had one welcome consequence: after two increasingly stressful weeks, 
peace finally returned to the ship, at least temporarily. The extent of our emotions is evident in a 
video recorded shortly after setting off again from Manaus: 
 
 
As Anton put it in our audio journal: 
[Before leaving for Peru] we were […] worried about pirates and infections and how we 
thought our strong point was our teamwork, and the things we thought were dangerous 
were actually quite safe, and the things we thought were safe and very positive were 
actually the bigger danger to us while we were out here … [then audibly chuckling] this 
is probably one of the most profound things I’ve ever said in my life. 
While Miguel and Anton had little difficulty voicing their discontent, I was more guarded in 
expressing mine, though I did so privately, in my fieldnotes:  
Look at the state of us. There’s so little that is beautiful: the fiery swamp inside reeks of 
selfishness and opportunism and hatred. There is no love of neighbor. There is not even 
love of self. What there is instead is a self-loathing and ruthless desire to fill that aching 
void by means of deception by living off the hopes of easy prey, feasting on those less 
assertive or more gullible, and when these coffers are empty then to feast on each other 
instead. Our hunger, alas, is never satisfied, for depravity and loathing are bottomless. 
Looking back now at the footage, audio journal and fieldnotes, our reactions were neither balanced 
nor fair (and not least as far as Miguel was concerned). But we were angry, resentful, and had been 
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robbed off any illusion that this row might actually be an enjoyable adventure. We had become 
afraid, and for having been made to feel afraid, found our pride hurt.  
This may explain the euphoria we felt as Anton and I powered east towards the point where 
the Amazon and Rio Negro rivers meet and, given their temperature differences, don’t merge until 
several miles downstream. We playfully navigated the razor-sharp line separating the two rivers 
while the fun lasted, the milky-tea colored Amazon on bow-side and the pitch-black Rio Negro on 
the other. Little did we know that our most terrifying experiences were still ahead of us: a nighttime 
Catch-22 “escapade” with drug traffickers and a near-miss with a cargo-carrying barge. By this 
time, we’d enjoyed several narrow escapes already as boats passed uncomfortably close. Smaller 
vessels included fishing boats and those ferrying passengers for which we were entertainment. At 
night, we faced barges and fast-moving speedboats. The latter only featured in a short stretch of 
river popular with narcotics traffickers, their powerful boats zipping from bank to bank, 
perpendicular to our direction of travel. They went about their business under the cover of darkness 
with all lights off, presumably not expecting much in the way of traffic. Because we didn’t fancy 
our chances upon discovery, we too kept our navigation light off, skulking the river in a “damned 
if you do, damned if you don’t” fashion, focused on the probable rather than possible.  
Cargo barges, by contrast, made deep, rumbling noises. They typically comprised large 
pontoons, three or four at a time, driven upstream by a diesel-powered push boat in complete 
darkness, with the exception of a powerful beam that would scan the tree-line every so often. 
Seeing as they typically hugged the riverbank, we had resorted to moving closer to the middle of 
the river to given them a wide berth. As our own navigation light polluted our line of sight (seeing 
in the dark was difficult enough as is), we would often hear but, until the very last moment, not 
see an outline of the convoy.  
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--- Insert Photo 5 here --- 
In the dead of night, early into my shift, I registered the sounds of a diesel engine. By this time 
in our journey, Anton and I had developed habits to help us cope with nighttime mosquitos and 
clammy nights. So, to fight off insects, Anton rowed in a zebra-patterned onesie, acquired pre-trip 
to humor locals, while I preferred to use the cover of darkness to row in the buff. I expected the 
sound to pass, as it had on many a night. It grew louder instead. Spooked, I grabbed a flashlight to 
find a pontoon heading straight for us and now nearly on top of us. A collision would have capsized 
the boat; the cabin would have filled up, and Anton would surely have drowned. Had I survived, 
I’d have been left in the middle-of-nowhere, stripped of any material possessions. The guilt of 
Anton drowning on my watch would have likely dispatched me, even if nothing else had. And so, 
my body did the only thing it knew now to do: it roared. It needed to rouse Anton. It also began to 
backpaddle mightily, unthinkingly, pushing the stern backwards to get the boat out of harm’s way 
while Anton, delirious with sleep, hand-pumped a plastic horn to awaken the jungle. We lived to 
tell the tale, of course, and learned to snigger it off over the next few days, as one does, imagining 
the captain’s surprise at discovering a bright yellow vessel, a man in a zebra suit, and another up 
to no good. 
--- Insert Photo 6 here --- 
I elaborated on our experience of fear because the accumulation of it was deeply felt and fully 
embodied, and moral and physical depletion were both context for, and means of, sensemaking. 
What we did and didn’t do can only ever be understood (if not excused) when appreciating “how 
things felt” at the time. In the example above, I referred to my panicking self as “it” to reflect that 
my reaction was instinctive and deeply corporeal. Such experiences meant that our sensemaking 
around encounters with locals, changing weather conditions, and night-time rowing was typically 
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tilted in favor of foe rather than friend, risk rather than rewards, and the dreadful rather than the 
beautiful. And it is against this background that we reconsider the four episodes from Findings I, 
this time “from the body” as a new way of seeing.   
Preoccupation with boat speed. Boat speed and safety rapidly became our chief concerns. 
Finding fast-flowing water on the Amazon takes considerable skill because it is very difficult to 
see differences in the flow of water across such a large river. As explained in Findings I, we used 
our GPS for speed readings, able to tell whether we had moved into a faster current. But what our 
GPS couldn’t tell us is whether a higher speed reading was the result of greater efficiency or greater 
exertion of power on our end. Speed was only ever accurately assessed by our bodies knowing 
how hard they had to work to achieve a particular GPS speed reading, whether this involved more, 
or less, effort than was the case with a previous current, and whether maintaining this effort was 
sustainable. Head winds offset boat speed and gusts pushed the boat off stream. Choppy waters 
changed the oar’s purchase in the water while islands, submerged sandbanks, and side streams 
altered the current. Shortcuts sliced across large bends in the river but would often pass through 
stagnant water. Even with access to an electronic map upon entering Brazil, the map did not 
account for the fact that flood waters constantly change the path and shape of the Amazon and its 
innumerable tributaries, islands and sandbanks.  
Such sources of ambiguity quickly became ordinary, with the result that GPS location readings 
and boat speed were never ready-to-use indices of our circumstances. Rather, making sense of 
location and speed involved a certain kind of work: judging boat speed in light of salient features 
of the situation, including our perceptions of local topography. Sensations from our bodies, such 
as the build-up of lactic acid in our leg muscles, were guides to how hard we were working to 
maintain a given speed. When our backs were too sore to continue zigzagging across the river in 
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search of faster currents, we would look for floating debris: if stuff traveled faster than the boat, it 
was riding a faster current. When debris was too far out or unavailable, we would aim for the river 
bank: steep banks indicate deep waters, and deep waters faster currents. But maneuvering close to 
the bank held its own ambiguities; depth was difficult to perceive in the opaque water, and 
sandbanks were an ever-present risk of us running aground.  
The impact of a river current on speed wasn’t foreign to either of us. As active members of a 
rowing community for most of our adult lives, we were well aware of boat speed being a function 
of the ability to leverage fast flowing water, and of rhythm (or coordination). The experience of 
rhythm in rowing is almost entirely visceral yet does not rely on any specific sensory perception. 
It relies on neither cognition nor speech acts—it isn’t an intellectual accomplishment—nor is it 
clear where in the body the feeling is located. Rather, rhythm is felt throughout the body (de Rond, 
2008; Ingold, 2011: 60, in Dall’Alba et al., 2017: 10). For example, a few days into the journey, 
we decided on an impromptu competition, rowing alone, and in various combinations, to see who 
was quickest. Anton and I, as a pair, easily came out tops, not because we were physically stronger 
but because our bodies knew how to coordinate so as to feel, and adjust, their way into a powerful 
rhythm. We coordinated through felt experience, meaning that our bodies sensed, rather than 
thought or talked, their way into action. Insofar as multiple features of the situation were perceived 
through bodily senses, we might say that our sensemaking proceeded from the body.  
Struggling with a whirlpool. In a telling episode featured in Findings I, I can be seen struggling 
but failing to keep our vessel on course. The boat is being pulled firmly to port side, and try as I 
might, I cannot correct for it, nor do I know what is causing the pull. Not fancying the prospect of 
being seen to be a wuss (particularly not given that Anton and I were knee-deep into a tiresome 
battle over our respective places in the pecking order), I push down hard instead with my right leg 
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while lightening up on my left, concerned all the while that the asymmetry in power might mess 
up my back. A sharp pain shooting up the right side of my spine is a tell-tale sign of the risk 
involved as I continue to drive my oars through the milky water.8 My initial suspicion of being 
caught in a whirlpool isn’t supported by the visible evidence: the water looks no different on either 
side of the boat. I know I am doing everything right and yet it all feels wrong, and so as to keep 
the bow straight, I have begun to row lopsided, with most of the power directed to my right leg, 
back and arm, and it is starting to hurt.  
I finally swallow my pride and call it out, asking Miguel what side of the river I should be 
rowing on. He tells me, from inside the cabin, to look for a stronger current. I explain my 
conundrum: I’m being pulled consistently to one side. My body knew something wasn’t right, yet 
I was unable to identify the source of the problem. Instead of asking for help right away, I put 
myself at risk of injury in delaying my call as I worried that doing so would affirm what I suspected 
Anton and Miguel knew all along: that I was the weakest link.  
Rowing in tidal waters. Our practice of chasing currents by looking for drifting logs or debris 
had long since given way to rowing diagonally across the river while comparing GPS speed 
readings with our felt exertion and attending to small differences in each. As the river widened, 
this heuristic of crossing the river was the only option left to us to put ourselves in the path of a 
potentially more favorable current. But, in the final days of the journey, when the river’s width 
came to span several miles, traversing it in search of fast water became unfeasible. Besides, without 
                                               
8 While rowers talk of “pulling the oars”, boat speed is really achieved by pushing down the legs. The arms are a 
relatively weak muscle group compared to the leg muscles, and to row a boat effectively means to use the hands as 
hooks, arms straight, holding the oars, while the legs push down. The arms really only ever pull towards the end of a 
stroke so as to bring the oar into the body before tapping down and straightening the arms again in preparation for 
the next stroke. Thus, an expression that makes sense in fixed-seat rowing boats has little descriptive currency in the 
sliding-seat shells used in river rowing. 
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the shelter of a nearby bank, increasing exposure to wind made for slow progress, and keeping the 
boat straight forced us to pull on the oars asymmetrically, risking our backs.  
We decided to change the schedule to row in alternating, 30-minute spurts to save our backs, 
before prioritizing rowing together rather than in turns, except at night. Given the river traffic, one 
of us had to be awake at all times. When the wind was at its worst, and without ever owning up to 
it except in the privacy provided by our audio journal and my fieldnotes, we would sometimes fold 
a tee-shirt into a pillow, pull in the oars and rest our heads on them, letting currents do what currents 
do well. When hitting submerged sandbanks, the only option was deeply unattractive: to jump into 
the impenetrable river, occasionally sinking knee-deep into the mud, and push the boat out. 
Piranhas were the least of our worries—the river contained plenty easier prey—the greater risk 
being that of disturbing a stingray or electric eel. Our fear of the dark invariably gave way to 
beautiful sunrises, accompanied by grey and pink dolphins playing alongside the boat and 
ultimately the madness of the cruel midday sun.  
Slow progress meant we became increasingly anxious about the possibility of missing our 
flights home. As Anton upped his codeine-based meds, and as I experimented with ever more 
creative ways to palliate my posterior, we attended to our moods by changing our GPS to display 
speed in kilometers rather than miles. Whilst fully aware that we were cheating ourselves, it did 
give us a false sense of progress.  
Just over twenty-four hours before the end of our voyage, having enjoyed a particularly swift 
current, we hit the wall. Mine had been the last of the three-hour night shifts (from 0300 to 0600) 
and I was desperate for sleep. Yet Anton, standing on deck and peering into the distance, was 
convinced there was a tributary, a potential shortcut, some distance downriver. There were boats 
coming from it and going into it, he said, and persuaded me to forego breakfast and join him on 
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the oars for a while longer. What he swore would only take a short while seemed to take forever. 
The sun was bearing heavily down on our heads, and without nutrition and water, and after five 
hours of continuous rowing, I began to feel physically sick. My breathing had become shallow and 
quick, I felt dizzy and unable to formulate a coherent string of words, let alone think. I’d had a 
strong and persistent pain in the upper left part of my chest, which worried me greatly. The tanks, 
to rely on a bit of rowing vernacular, were empty. And yet Anton kept calling for more until, at 
last, after hours of backbreaking work, we capitulated and stopped rowing altogether. We had 
barely been moving at all, even if the topography suggested we should have been in a relatively 
fast bit of river. Funny thing is, this bit of river had shown itself to be quick only a few hours ago. 
We’d been doing everything right.  
As we sat licking our wounds, our eyes fixed on the GPS, it appeared we were drifting 
backwards. Come to think of it, it had felt all along as if we were rowing against, rather than with, 
the current, but why so? We dropped an anchor to take stock and to decide on a way forward whilst 
not surrendering any of our hard-won territory. Much of what unfolded next was captured on 
camera and discussed in Findings I. What is difficult to appreciate from the video footage is the 
sheer amount of time it took for us to finally latch on to the fact that we might be in a tidal current. 
With hindsight it is easy to see how a tidal current might explain ever-greater differences in boat 
speed: hours of momentum cut short by hours of inching along followed by another solid 
performance in a game of tag. Yet our bodies were simply too exhausted to clue in on the symbols 
doled out by our GPS and changes in water height with respect to the river bank. Moreover, life 
on the boat had become so emotionally overloaded and volatile that this affective backdrop likely 
masked the emotional highs and lows we felt with these rounds of increasingly swift and then slow 
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progress, limiting our ability to notice important cues while wasting precious time and resource by 
proceeding inefficiently along the river’s course.  
Coping with physical injury. If we take seriously the view that the body has currency in 
sensemaking, it stands to reason that changes in the body manifest themselves as changes in 
sensemaking capacity. For example, the constant dousing with water led to “nappy rash” that, in 
my case, developed into a painful abscess. As the abscess and my discomfort grew, I cut a hole in 
my rowing seat, figuring that I would be able to continue rowing so long as I fit the sore into the 
hole. A physician in the UK had meanwhile decided the risk of sepsis was serious and instructed 
us, via satellite phone, to make an incision and “lance the boil”, using surgical equipment procured 
by a resourceful medical student back home. I chose to forego the anesthetic jab to minimize risk, 
while Anton readied himself with gloves and a surgical blade. I sourced a clean bit of towel to get 
my teeth into in preparation for the most unwanted, intimate encounter yet of this voyage. One of 
our video segments shows Anton plodding away in a medical procedure neither of us is likely to 
quickly forget (see Photo 7).  
--- Insert Photo 7 here --- 
While some of the evidence of the body’s role in sensemaking plays out immediately, my 
abscess illustrates how my body’s ability to sense-make changes over time. Harsh temperatures 
had led to dousing which had caused skin damage and laborious skin care practices, an unwelcome 
bit of amateur surgery, and corresponding modifications to rowing equipment. Courses of action 
that were once sensible and ought to have maintained our bodily capacities, by keeping us cool 
enough to row effectively, had unforeseen and ongoing consequences. Significantly, however, 
exposure to continual physical exertion, repetition of movement, and injury over time did not 
change each of our bodies in the same way, or to the same extent. Thus, while Miguel and I suffered 
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nappy rash, Anton did not, and while Miguel’s rash didn’t produce anything more serious, mine 
did, with considerable consequences for my ability to “feel” the water. Making subtle adjustments 
while rowing (so as to work with, rather than against, the river) was made difficult by the need to 
maintain a posture such that my abscess would continue to fit my DIY seat. Accordingly, it would 
be naïve to imagine that this bodily wear and tear was of no consequence in how we made sense 
of the shifting circumstances of the voyage, where reason itself was fashioned out of these 
changing particulars of our flesh and blood. And to the extent that reasoning relied on sensory 
inputs, our bodies were never just in service of the mind. Occasionally, bodies do as bodies will. 
That is to say, bodies need not “check in” with a mind because they are mindful by definition: 
unique configurations of achievements and failures, shaped and reshaped through socialization and 
repeated exposure to, in our case, rowing practice.9 
DISCUSSION 
We began with the observation that contemporary sensemaking studies overwhelmingly focus on 
cognition and discourse as the central modes through which people construct meaningful 
narratives out of ambiguous situations (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Colville et al., 2012; Weick, 
2012). Yet sensemaking scholarship has shown surprisingly little interest in the senses (Sandberg 
& Tsoukas, 2014). Recent empirical work has begun to redress this by exploring specific aspects 
of embodiment. For example, visceral and emotional reactions can provide the disruptive cues that 
trigger sensemaking (Maitlis, 2009), and emotional expressions and physical gestures contribute 
to how sensemaking unfolds among multiple participants (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Heaphy, 
                                               
9 They are also deeply enculturated. To illustrate, upon our arrival in Columbia, and in the spirit of “when in Rome 
…”, Anton ordered deep-fried larva de palma, a local delicacy. His gagging reflex upon the first bite, and refusal to 
eat more, is a poignant reminder of just how socialization writes itself into our physical bodies. As the 
anthropologist Matthew Engelke (2017: 29-32) explains, having been offered a cricket to eat during his fieldwork in 
Chiweshe, Zimbabwe, his vomiting up the insect was not a “natural” or biological reaction. Rather, his (and 
Anton’s) body reacted as it did because it is deeply enculturated, and in his culture, people don’t eat crickets. All the 
anthropological learning in the world could not undo twenty years of life (2017: 31).  
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2017). Further, the body plays a role in restricting or forestalling sensemaking. Embodied reactions 
like pain might block sensemaking because they “narrow attention in various ways” (Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010: 573), while intense emotions can restrict people’s capacities to make sense 
(Cornelissen, Mantere & Vaara, 2014). Among these contributions, the most relevant for our 
purposes is Cunliffe and Coupland’s (2012) exploration of “embodied narrative sensemaking”. 
Based on a film documentary of the 2001 British and Irish Lions [football] tour of Australia, the 
authors zoom in on a defining incident to foreground the role of intuition and felt bodily 
interpretations in sensemaking. Their conceptual point of departure is similar to our own: sense is 
made through the totality of experience (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012: 78); occurs in the “lived 
experience of everyday, ordinary interactions”, is temporal and subject to multiple, contested 
narratives, and is a fully “embodied process of interpretation of self and experience” (Cunliffe & 
Coupland, 2012: 64). While sympathetic to their ontological claim and attention to 
phenomenology, our project offers a different methodology as the basis for a complementary 
research approach to embodied sensemaking. That is to say, carnal sociology as a bundle of 
ontological, epistemological and methodological claims (see Methodology II) provides for a 
particular set of affordances: being able to tune in to how sensemaking felt to one of those involved, 
we came to understand how sensemaking is mediated by embodied experience.  
While the idea of embodiment creates few, if any, real difficulties in everyday life, to parse 
embodiment into analytically distinct constructs is fiendishly (and famously) complex (cf. 
Merleau-Ponty, 1968). Lacking a vocabulary, we quickly find ourselves “suspended in 
hyphens”—mind-body, bio-social, psycho-somatic, socio-material—and typically end up 
reinforcing the very duality we so wish to transcend (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987: 10). It is in 
foregrounding the lived experience in Findings II that we allow “nature, society and culture [to] 
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speak simultaneously”, where the mindful body is “the most immediate, the proximate terrain 
where social truths and social contradictions are played out, as well as a locus of personal and 
social resistance, creativity, and struggle” (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987: 31).  
And it is here that carnal sociology can be helpful in drawing attention to aspects of the human 
experience that are consequential to it but difficult to access via methodological approaches other 
than enactive ethnography. Rather than limiting oneself to that which is most easily observable 
“from the outside looking in” (such as sensorimotor behaviors), enactive ethnography’s 
affordances foreground, in real time, whole body experiences of a particular situation in a particular 
social and material context “from the inside out”. Whatever the merits of “second-order” 
explorations of sensemaking, these remain of the body, not from it (cf. Gärtner, 2013: 342; 
Wacquant, 2015). In Table 1, we summarize how a carnal sociological account from the body 
builds on and departs from both narrative/discursive approaches to sensemaking, and of the body 
approaches to sensemaking in its core claims and assumptions, methodological approach, and key 
findings. This table illustrates that many of the core claims and assumptions underpinning a from 
the body approach are relatively compatible with other approaches to sensemaking. However, the 
novel affordances of enactive ethnography allow for yet further insights into how the holistic, 
situated bodied is engaged in sensemaking and what this implies for our understanding of the 
sensemaking process and its relation to the sensemakers themselves. 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
Below, by contrasting what we see from the video analysis portrayed in Findings I, with what 
we see using an enactive ethnography in Findings II, we further unpack the promise of carnal 
sociology as the basis for a from the body research approach to organizational sensemaking. We 
draw attention to the generative potential of three specific issues: (1) articulating the role and 
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importance of the holistic body to how sensemaking arises and proceeds, (2) attending to the “who” 
of sensemaking, and (3) the broader methodological implications of carnal sociology for 
organizational sensemaking. 
The holistic body in sensemaking 
Following the ontological claim that we are suffering beings of flesh and blood who relate to 
the world, act in the world, and reflect upon the world using all our available senses, Wacquant 
offers a set of conceptual handholds to help us explore how body and mind are reciprocally 
implicated in sensemaking. While we recognize that these handholds are fully entangled with each 
other, drawing attention to them separately can help us to unpack how they are implicated. For 
example, sentience is our ability to perceive, to feel pain and joy and fear, and to make sense of 
subjective sensory experience. Findings II moves beyond the body as a sensory organ to also 
demonstrate this sentience, or our ability to feel and be conscious of our feelings, and points to our 
body as the “synthesizing medium” of this sensory muddle (Wacquant, 2015: 3). While our video 
analysis showed the rowers navigating the Amazon by sensing its currents through their physical 
bodies, our subsequent carnal account adds far more texture to the felt subjective experience. 
Anton, Mark and Miguel “felt” as much as “thought” their way across the water, but their sentience 
also showed up in experiences of fear and worry triggered by near-collisions with river traffic at 
night, tropical storms, uncertain encounters with locals and bouts of frustration and anger directed 
at each other. Being confined to a few square feet with no real option to stop and dismount, chronic 
fatigue, lack of privacy, and continual anxiety around the risk of piracy and collision impacted on 
their sensemaking. Their crankiness and vigilance (not least with respect to each other) made it 
difficult to relate to, and empathize with, each other, and to communicate and coordinate efforts. 
For example, when Mark struggles with the whirlpool, he delays mentioning what he is 
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experiencing to the others for fear that he may lose credibility if he does. To the outsider, this 
incident is shaped by Mark’s physical experience of the ambiguous current, the talk that leads to a 
collective account of what is going on, and a course of action to escape it. But to the one performing 
the phenomenon, it is shaped by a more holistic experience of being aware of one’s place in a petty 
pecking order with consequences for one’s willingness to speak up and ask for help. Balanced 
against an awareness of physical pain that might signal impending injury, this further risked an 
already fragile set of circumstances. Thus, the crucible for sensemaking is not simply one in which 
aspects of the body can be parsed out and foregrounded as consequential. Only the holistic 
subjective experience and its placement in social, physical and temporal context, can explain where 
and how sensemaking may unfold.  
Beyond sentience, carnal sociology affords an exploration of sensemaking as related to 
suffering, or the degree to which we feel, absorb, and endure the “threats and blows of the natural 
and social worlds” (Wacquant, 2015: 3). We could see traces of suffering from our video analysis 
and surmise how these shaped sensemaking. It was clear that the bodies that arrived in Macapá 
were different, and differently abled, from those that left Nauta. While the video footage shows 
Mark’s body changing over time with injury, sleep deprivation and lack of nutrition, it never quite 
captured the lived experience of being that body—an explosive mix of hunger and weariness, of 
resentment yet neediness, of fear and of wrath—and how that body did what it did because it knew 
what only it knew, and didn’t feel able, or didn’t desire, to do otherwise. The rowers at the end of 
the voyage were substantially thinner and less powerful, sore and therefore unwilling to take 
certain risks, than those who began it. To be sure, changes to their rowing schedule—a “two-hours-
on-two-hours-off” giving way to “30-minutes-on-30-minutes-off” and subsequently a decision to 
row in pairs for blocks of time with the onset of strong headwinds—could be attributed to an 
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updating of sense (Christianson, 2019), given that the conditions changed over time and 
adjustments were made in response to the ambiguity imposed by entering the tidal zone of the 
river. Yet such an interpretation misses the visceral experience of bodies so physically and 
emotionally exhausted, and morally defeated, that they endangered themselves further by simply 
going on. 
Our case is perhaps an extreme one in that it foregrounds physical and emotional suffering as 
an aspect of the holistic embodied experience more prominently than one might encounter in other 
settings. Nonetheless, it draws attention to the importance of attending holistically to the body in 
more typical settings for organizational sensemaking. We know from prior work that the body is 
central to how work gets done in such mainstream settings as investment banks (Michel, 2011; 
Pérezts, Faÿ, & Picard, 2015), healthcare organizations (Heaphy, 2017; Hindmarsh & Pilnick; 
2007;) and broadcasting and computer gaming companies (Gylfe, Franck, Lebaron, &  Mantere, 
2015; Liu & Maitlis, 2014). In these settings, using methodological tools of video (primarily), 
interviews, or shadowing, scholars have shown how bodies communicate nonverbally, transmit 
emotion and enable coordination, which in turn shapes strategizing and supports collective action 
(Gylfe et al., 2014; Heaphy, 2017; Hindmarsh & Pilnick; 2007; Liu & Maitlis, 2014). In cases 
where scholars have had direct personal experience, such as Michel’s (2011) 9-year ethnographic 
study of how investment bankers’ bodies are shaped by organizational control through 
socialization, or Perezts et al.’s (2015) study of the embodied collective practices of anti-money 
laundering analysts, we see more starkly how the moral, relational, and physical aspects of being 
embodied shape organizational practice. While these latter two studies do not speak directly to 
sensemaking, they illustrate the potential for a carnal sociology approach to illuminate more 
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holistically the aspects of human experience that are so consequential to how work gets done in 
mainstream organizational settings.  
Some settings and circumstances may be particularly amenable to a carnal sociology 
approach. First, as our data show, longitudinal engagement in an organizational setting affords 
opportunities to experience how the body changes—physically, emotionally, and relationally—
over time, and to potentially trace the cumulative effects on the body (as experiences are 
sedimented) as well as how these changes alter sensemaking from the body. Studies of longitudinal 
processes—like socialization and how this relates to sensemaking about one’s own identity (Pratt 
et al., 2006; Petrigrieli, 2011) or an organization’s or industry’s demands (Michel, 2011)—could 
be particularly well suited to a carnal sociology. Other longitudinal processes that have been 
studied from a sensemaking perspective, including changes in identity or identification (Pratt, 
2000; Pratt et al., 2006; Vough, 2012) or organizational change processes (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004; Ravasi & Shultz, 2006; Mantere et al, 2012), could also be productively traced through a 
carnal sociology approach.  
Second, carnal sociology is well suited to studying everyday “immanent” sensemaking 
(Sandberg & Touskas, 2015) and how it shapes core organizational processes such as coordination 
(e.g. Bechky, 2006), performing routines (e.g. Feldman, 2000; Howard-Grenville, 2005), or 
strategizing (e.g. Kaplan, 2008; Liu & Maitlis, 2014), for these have been productively studied 
through attention to the everyday interactions. Finally, carnal sociology can augment our 
understanding of temporary organizations that rely on “an ever-changing cast of team members, 
many of whom have never met, to make sense of and work together on a high-stakes, time-
pressured task” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014: 87). Rather than relying on specialized experience, 
researchers may join others in processes of improvisation in what can be highly unpredictable 
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settings. For example, Danner-Schröder and Geiger (2016) studied the enactment of routines in a 
simulated earthquake recovery training exercise, where the first author experienced how “frequent 
rehearsals during training sessions ... contributed to an embodiment of the necessary “knowing 
how’’ by the team members” (p. 646).  
Each of these settings would be ripe for a carnal sociology approach where the holistic 
embodied experience of participation can help advance scholarship. As Anteby (2013) notes, 
ethnography is an obvious method for generating insight from one’s own experience but the 
opportunity to use embodied insight “holds true at various degrees for all field researchers and is 
integral to all research pursuits” (p. 1282). Indeed, Anteby (2013: 1282) cites earlier research to 
note that: ““the information obtained, rather than the experience lived, remains the focus of most 
field-based studies” (Georges and Jones, 1980, p. 3)” There are various ways to capture “the 
experience lived”, as demonstrated in this paper, from video and audio diaries to fieldnotes and 
photographs. We invite scholars to explore the full extent of these tools in accounting more fully 
for the explanatory power of “the constitution of sensemakers” on sensemaking itself in a variety 
of organizational settings (Sandberg & Tsoukas; 2015: 36).  
From the “how” to the “who” in sensemaking 
This leads to a second feature that “from the body” sensemaking attends to: the importance of 
theorizing the “who” of sensemaking alongside the “how.” From its earliest incarnations (e.g., 
Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1988; Louis, 1980), the sensemaking literature has focused on 
explaining how sensemaking is accomplished: through noticing cues, interpreting them and taking 
action. So pervasive is the focus on the “how” of sensemaking that Maitlis and Christianson (2014) 
use these three aspects (noticing, interpreting and acting) as the organizing frame for their review 
of 20 years of the literature. Contemporary debates have elaborated on the “how” of organizational 
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sensemaking, for example, by arguing for greater attention to noticing and action, for paying more 
attention to the flow of sensemaking rather than its triggering through punctuation, and for 
exploring how updating of already-made sense is accomplished (Christianson, 2017; Rudolph, 
2009; Weick, 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015).  
Carnal sociology, as shown in Findings II, brings the sensemaker to the foreground. In so 
doing, it enables us to recognize the way that individual’s skills, and their sedimented and situated 
nature, shapes their capacity to make sense, and the sense that is made. There is a role for biography 
and individual history in that the “how” of sensemaking can never be understood as inoculated 
from the “who”. People are not interchangeable: it matters that they are capable of doing some 
things but not others, that they differ in what they can tolerate, that they desire specific people but 
are unable to stomach others, while yet others cannot stand having them around, or are put off by 
their smell, demeanor, or the sound of their voice. As Hall (1968) suggested, we cannot assume 
that people share phenomenological experience; to the contrary, people appear to inhabit distinct 
sensory worlds and also experience space differently (cf. Low, 2003). These capacities have been 
“implanted, cultivated and deployed over time through our engagement in the world, […] 
gradually deposited in our body as the layered product of our varied individual and collective 
histories” (Wacquant, 2015: 4; cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). They, in turn, shape what a person 
regards as normal or anomalous, and what she does as a result. As Findings II shows, opportunities 
for sensemaking arose when Mark and Anton struggled to manipulate the boat due to the Amazon’s 
currents, despite their superior skill as rowers. Their bodies were typical of rowers’ bodies—tall, 
so as to maximize leverage and with strong upper legs, bottoms and core muscles—and their callus 
formation and ability to generate faster speeds were indicative of years of rowing practice. There 
were things their bodies knew how to do, and did unthinkingly and without injury, that Miguel’s 
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took pains to learn. However, Miguel’s experience of navigating the Amazon led him to have 
different embodied skills, such as the ability to read a stretch of water. By contrast, Miguel’s body 
was sinewy, with a strong torso, characteristic of the fighting body. His scars told of the violence 
his body had witnessed first-hand, in a prior life, and what his body would now tolerate and, by 
implication, what he would be prepared to do to keep the three of them alive. His experience, 
therefore, led him to tune into, and respond to, dangers differently from how Mark and Anton 
would. Mark recalls Miguel’s occasional requests for all three to stand on deck, making themselves 
as large as possible, to warn suspicious-looking others of their physical size and intention to not 
be intimidated.  
Skills and their sedimentation are never purely physical; rather, they embed in cognition and 
shape it. Recent studies into embodied cognition (see Beilock, 2015) for a useful summary, and 
Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) for the relevance of such studies for sensemaking) provide powerful 
evidence of this. For example, elite tennis players see the net as lower than novices (Witt & 
Sugovic, 2010), while elite field-goal kickers perceive the uprights as thicker (Witt & Dorsch, 
2009), and elite dart players targets as larger (Wesp et al., 2004). Conversely, hills look steeper for 
those out of shape or wearing a backpack (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999) or when alone or in the 
company of someone one dislikes (Schnall et al., 2008), and distances appear up to 30 percent 
farther away for those with aches or pains (Witt et al., 2009). The sedimentation of the body is 
therefore not determinate; it is entangled with other aspects of the human experience in the here-
and-now. So, while Mark and Anton were able to row efficiently in the best of circumstances, 
having suffered chronic fatigue and nutritional deficiency, persistent back aches and a painful 
abscess, their capacity to make sense varied situationally. For example, the hours it took for Anton 
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and Mark to finally cue in to the fact that they had been rowing against the tide can only be fully 
grasped from the perspective of how depleted they were at the time.  
The “who” of sensemaking must therefore also be understood as situated, not just within a 
person’s own embodied history, but also temporally, socially, and in physical and cultural space. 
Just as an individual might detect and act on cues differently based on his skill, sedimentation, and 
situatedness, these factors may equally lead him to actively ignore opportunities for sensemaking. 
For example, the physical space available on board to rest and recuperate, to reflect and react, was 
severely curtailed. As noted briefly in Findings II, interpersonal conflicts typically happened when 
the threesome had to moor up to check in with the Navy in major towns along the route. This is 
conceivably because it is easier to walk away from conflict when not confined to a boat in the 
middle of a river and surrounded by jungle. Thus, the rowers will have self-censored when on 
board, ignoring opportunities to discursively make sense, given the potentially serious 
consequence of falling out.10 
Shifting greater attention to the “who” of sensemaking is consistent with perspectives that 
situate organizational life (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011), and demonstrate that people are not 
interchangeable in how they, for example, perceive problems (Bechky, 2003), perform routines 
(Howard-Grenville, 2005), or engage with technologies (Orlikowski, 1996). Accordingly, it can 
show how accounting for specific people in specific circumstances shapes the actual process of 
sensemaking. Specific people, of course, have always been present in accounts of sensemaking, 
even if the import of their embodied, sedimented, and situated skills were rarely ever made explicit. 
For example, Whiteman and Cooper’s (2010) account of how Whiteman’s lack of embeddedness 
                                               
10 Mark remembers talking to submariners during his fieldwork in a field hospital in Helmand (de Rond, 2017; de 
Rond, 2016), where those having spent 3 months confined to a submarine would often comment on how little 
conflict there was during that period, only for it to crop up when back on shore. They explained that one simply 
could not afford to have all-out conflicts on a submarine given the limited space available. 
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in the harsh Canadian subarctic led to her slipping and falling into a river, risking drowning and 
hypothermia, is illuminating for suggesting that the person doing the sensemaking can be hugely 
(and so nearly fatally) consequential for the sense that is made. By contrast, Whiteman’s informant, 
a Cree trapper who had lived his entire life in the subarctic and was physically differently endowed, 
made different sense of ecological cues that Whiteman missed, and ensured her survival.  
Beyond seeing how cues for sensemaking are in part shaped by who the sensemaker is, and 
how she arrived at the situated sensemaking occasion, paying attention to the “who” invites new 
ways of seeing the temporality, pacing, and path dependency of sensemaking. Sensemaking is 
often taken as occurring in fleeting moments, difficult to capture except in retrospect, and this may 
be one reason why so many contemporary sensemaking studies focus on interpretation at the 
expense of attending to the processes of noticing and acting. Weick himself noted (1995: 49) that 
“sensemaking tends to be swift, which means we are more likely to see products than processes.” 
This may be particularly true when we have the capacity to only see sensemaking from the outside. 
But from the perspective of Wacquant’s carnal sociology, what leads in to any given sensemaking 
episode is the embodied and lived histories of prior ones (or prior opportunities for making sense 
untaken, due to petty disagreements, grumpiness, exhaustion, or real or imagined relational 
dramas). Carnal sociology shows how being thusly situated does not lend itself to neatly parsed 
stimulus-response patterns that might give parsimonious (but often misleading) cues to 
sensemaking triggers and actions. Indeed, carnal sociology shows us that the situatedness of action 
involves both the embodied present and past, or the totality of the experiences that shape how we 
show up.  
Again, these observations have implications for more typical organizational settings. Indeed, 
much of the sensemaking literature notes the importance of situatedness to the triggering of 
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sensemaking and how it unfolds, in the sense that the particular nature of a crisis and its timing 
(Christianson, et al., 2009), or the nature of a threat to the organization’s collective identity 
(Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006), or the way in which an organizational change 
initiative is handled (Mantere, Schildt, & Sillince, 2012) matters greatly to how people react and 
make sense. Thus, the broader call for us to better explore how the “constitution of sensemakers” 
(Sandberg & Touskas, 2015:36) comes into play urges us to pay attention to different embodied 
endowments and experiences that people enter sensemaking situations with, and how these may 
be privileged or suppressed given situational features, interpersonal dynamics, or broader patterns 
of cultural and power relations around such factors as gender, race, age or ethnicity. 
Finally, we caution that the “who” of sensemaking not be taken as the atomized individual. 
As carnal sociology and our findings show, the embodied experience of sensemaking is always in 
relation to one’s social situation and the relationships (and their histories) in which one is 
entangled. To this end, we do not deny that sensemaking is inherently social, but we insist that to 
understand how it plays out intersubjectively, we need to go beyond the current overwhelming 
attention to discourse and language as the medium of sensemaking. As Maitlis and Christianson 
(2014: 81) observe in their review: “in most current writing, organizational sensemaking is more 
often understood as fundamentally concerned with language”. But in any organizational setting 
people also carry into sensemaking opportunities a host of relational baggage, which, for better or 
worse and no less so than on a boat in the Amazon, will shape their willingness to trust others’ 
experiences, their proclivity to speak up or stay silent about their own, or the lengths they will go 
to in support or denial of a course of action. For these reasons, Wacquant’s carnal sociology can 
bring new ways of seeing how sensemaking unfolds from the body, and through the body’s 
engagement in social settings, which are inherently entangled with the sentience, suffering, skills, 
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sedimentation, and situatedness of being a human body, in any organizational setting, typical or 
otherwise. 
Some methodological challenges 
We close with a reflection on the methodological challenges of using carnal sociology to 
further explore the embodied experience of organizational sensemaking. Performing the 
phenomenon calls on researchers to experience the sensations, skills, and situated actions of their 
informants. Clearly, in some settings this will prove difficult (e.g., as a member of a trauma 
surgical team when not medically trained). However, as Wacquant (2015: 5) observes:  
it is not always easy and straightforward to gain access to and perform on the target social 
scene: becoming an active member often takes time, having special qualities, or obtaining 
certification. You may just not possess the sang-froid needed to be a police officer or the 
litheness to be a ballerina, you cannot hope to become a judge on short order, and you 
will hopefully not be authorized to perform brain surgery at a top hospital for purposes 
of sociological understanding. But you could well become a props technician for the 
ballet, sign up as an intern with pretrial services, or work as an orderly in the operating 
ward. There are always multiple doors onto any stage. 
In certain settings, being a novice performing the phenomenon will be an advantage, for it can 
open researchers up to important new insights, especially if they work alongside those already 
skilled in the setting and use their experience to gain greater insight into the bodily skills and 
sedimentation that enable sensemaking. The limitations of studying settings where one might 
perform the phenomenon are also opportunities, for they likely put the researcher in position to 
capture the more mundane day-to-day sensemaking of people responding to their unfolding 
circumstances (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). The chances of being in the right place at the right 
time to capture sensemaking following a major disaster are low through this mode of research. 
Nonetheless, this can help correct for the sensemaking literature’s overreliance on archival data 
and formal interviews that reveal largely retrospective interpretations. Wacquant reminds us that 
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carnal sociology is applicable anywhere, not limited to the “extremes of society… or situations of 
risk and urgency” but as “a general approach to social life because all agents are embodied and all 
social life rests on a bedrock of visceral know-how” (2005: 466-7). 
Carnal sociology can also enhance other forms of data collection and analysis. In our case, the 
access to 755 video segments, 62 audio journals, fieldnotes and interviews, enabled us to generate 
an account of sensemaking (Findings I) that helped us draw out differences in the enactive account 
(Findings II). Watching and re-watching the video helped us see and occasionally pick out details 
that Mark was unable to recall when interviewed (such as Anton’s warning of the risks of dousing 
oneself). However, the authors who did not perform the phenomenon were obviously far less able 
to relate to the embodied experience that the video footage, audio journal and fieldnotes were there 
to convey. Despite working for years on these data, there are aspects of Mark’s account that two 
of the authors still found surprising and deeply illuminating as he put on the page what it really 
felt like. In fact, in writing Findings II, Mark noticed how the strong emotions of that time—and 
the anxiety, resentment and shame in particular—began once again to course through his arteries, 
even a full 5 years after pushing off from Peru. Ethnography never really leaves the body.  
A final challenge stems from the difficulty we have, as humans, and as researchers wedded to 
text as our way of reporting, in representing “being a lived body”. Our failure to do full justice to 
embodiment—to provide readers with a “here’s what it really all felt like” remains the least 
satisfactory part of this paper. As Heaphy, Locke and Booth (2014: pp 61) note: “writing about 
embodiment in a way that does not begin in the head is a real challenge; bringing the body forward 
in a way that represents the full expressive potential of the body (Michel, 2011; Quaeghebur, 2012) 
is working against habit of separating the mind and body and subjugating the body under the 
mind.” To address this challenge, we adopted a different writing style in Findings II to give 
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stronger voice to corporeal experience and foreground its role in sensemaking. In enactive 
ethnography, the self is the principal means by which we come to understand a community, 
process, phenomenon or situation, and while the self isn’t ever the point of inquiry, an ethnography 
may be more or less effective depending on choices of voice, style and the representation of self 
and others (cf. Goodall, 2010). Wacquant’s (2005) Body and Soul, for example, showcases the 
power of a first-person account from the body that also relies on colloquialisms and lingua franca. 
We encourage researchers to continue to explore additional means of exploring and 
communicating embodied organizational phenomenon.   
CONCLUSION 
By way of an enactive ethnography of a first-ever attempt to scull the length of the navigable 
Amazon, this paper developed a way of seeing sensemaking as unfolding from the body. This 
account of sensemaking attends to how the body is sensate, skilled, sedimented, situated and 
capable of suffering. While prior work on embodied sensemaking suggests how having a body 
influences the cues and processes involved, Wacquant’s carnal sociology enabled us to generate a 
more holistic account of how being a body is fully entangled with sensemaking. As with any 
attempt to introduce a “new way of seeing”, this approach needs kicking around but, we hope, has 
genuine promise to advance our understanding of sensemaking as deeply embodied, and as 
profoundly tied to the experience of flesh-and-blood fellow travelers.  
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Table 1: Comparing and contrasting approaches to sensemaking 
 Narrative/Discursive Approach to 
Sensemaking  
“Of the body” Approach to Sensemaking “From the body” Approach to Sensemaking 
Core claims/ 
assumptions 
• Sensemaking is a process that unfolds through 
noticing or bracketing cues, interpreting them, 
and taking action. 
• Sensemaking is social and is “constructed in 
language and shared through narrative” (Maitlis 
& Christianson, 2014: 99). 
• Sensemaking is “an ongoing process in which 
provisional understandings are constantly 
adjusted in response to new information or 
changing circumstances” (Christianson, 2019), 
which involves the ‘‘redrafting of an emerging 
story so that it becomes more comprehensive” 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2005: 415). 
• Sensemaking is a process that also unfolds through 
the embodied experience of ongoing everyday 
interactions (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2011; Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015). 
• Sensemaking is experiential in that “we make life 
sensible through our lived, felt bodily experiences and 
‘sensing’ of our surroundings.” (Cunliffe & Coupland, 
2011: 68) 
• Sensemaking need not only be episodic but can occur 
as “a mode of engagement whereby actors ... 
spontaneously respond to the developing situation at 
hand.” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015: 20) 
• Core claims and assumptions consistent with those 
in “of the body” and “narrative and discursive” 
approaches to sensemaking, plus: 
o Sensemaking is situated in the body’s 
individual history as well as in its social, 
relational, and cultural context. 
o Sensemaking may be episodic or ongoing but 
in each case is informed by the holistic 
experience of being a body (interacting with 
other bodies) in that setting. 
Methodological 
approach 
• Data sources include text or talk captured 
through archival material (e.g., Cornelissen et 
al., 2014) interviews (e.g., Maitlis, 2005) and/or 
observation (e.g., Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). 
• Analysis is focused on the sequence of and 
meanings ascribed to events or new 
information. 
• Data sources include text, talk, gestures, bodily 
orientations, emotions, and/or material cues captured 
through archival video (e.g., Cunliffe & Coupland, 
2011) proprietary video (e.g., Liu & Maitlis, 2014; 
Christianson, 2019; our ‘of the body’ account), and/or 
nonparticipant observation (e.g., Heaphy, 2017). 
• Analysis of sensorimotor responses, interactions with 
other people, and expressed emotion in relation to 
unfolding circumstances. 
• Data sources include first-person experience of 
performing the phenomenon of interest; video, 
audio and fieldnotes can be used as memory aids 
inasmuch as they record aspects of the experience 
as it unfolds (e.g., our data; Whiteman & Cooper, 
2011). 
• Analysis of sensorimotor experiences, relational 
tone, and felt emotion in relation to unfolding 
circumstances; enabled by the analytical handholds 
of carnal sociology (Wacquant, 2015) that we are 
“sensate, suffering, skilled, sedimented, and 
situated corporeal creatures.”  
Key Findings • Sensemaking inheres in shared 
meaning/interpretations that perpetuate or are 
periodically revised. (Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005; Christianson, 2019) 
• Emotions and the material environment enter in 
to sensemaking inasmuch as they trigger or 
forestall it, or aid in the construction of sense 
through discourse. (Maitlis, 2009; Cornelissen 
et al., 2014)  
• Expressing and displaying emotion mediates collective 
sensemaking. (Heaphy, 2017) 
• Bodily movements – including “verbal and facial 
expressions and body gestures ... convey the intensity 
of [peoples’] emotions and play into their attempts to 
make [a] situation sensible.” (Cunliffe & Coupland, 
2011: 80) 
• Sensemaking appears to draw on “intuitive and 
informed feeling in [the] body” (Cunliffe & Coupland, 
2011: 77; and in our video data of chasing currents), 
though this is observed by the analyst, not directly 
experienced. 
• Sensemaking unfolds from the holistic experience 
of being a body, including sensory experience 
entangled with emotional, physical, relational and 
moral aspects. 
• A person’s capacity for and engagement in 
sensemaking is shaped by their embodied 
experience and history, not only by the situation. 
i.e., the ‘who’ of sensemaking matters to how it 
unfolds. (e.g., our data; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). 



















































Photo 6: Anton in his zebra-patterned onesie (photo by Mark de Rond) 
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